A Platonically inclined student at Oxford University once scribbled on a wall: "Do not trust reality, for reality is always flawed." Is there a flaw in the reality of palliative care when Over 50 percent of 120 dying cancer patients in their last several days of life experienced physical suffering of such severity that it could be controlled only by sedation into unconsciousness prior to death? If not, then is the flaw rather in the assumption that a central objective of palliative care -adequate management of pain and symptoms while maintaining patient consciousness -can be generally, even if not universally, achieved? The Milan Study of Dr. Vittorio Ventafridda and colleagues, published in this issue of the Journal, forces us to raise these questions because it challenges' our assumptions, as Dr. Balfour Mount states in his guest editorial.
What are these assumptions? Well, we should first distinguish assumptions of principle from assumptions offact. A resolution of conflicts on matters of principle requires rigorous clarification of arguments and a critical appraisal of beliefs and perceptions. Resolution of conflicts on matters of fact depends upon more comprehensive and methodologically sound research. Conflicts about matters of fact cannot be resolved by argument. For conflicts of this kind, comprehensive rather than partial data constitute the final court of appeal.
There is very little controversy about the emancipation principle of palliative care: spare no scientific or clinical effort to free dying persons from twisting and racking pain that invades, dominates, and shrivels their consciousness, that leaves them no psychic or mental space for the things they want to think and say and do before they die.
There is little controversy about the fact that great progress has been made over the last several years in the scientific understanding of pain and in the development of integrated approaches to its management (1, 2, 3) . Methods exist today to control pain while maintaining consciousness.
There is also little controversy about the fact that a wide gap still exists between what can be done and what is actually achieved in freeing the dying from pain and distressing symptoms (4). Intense and sustained education is needed to narrow that gap.
Few would deny that persons with cancer experience multiple symptoms in the advanced stages of their disease and that these symptoins vary considerably with regard to frequency and severity and with regard to deleterious impact on psychological status, familial relationships, and general ability to function.
The Milan Study directs our attention to controversy about what happens to people when they are dying from advanced cancer. The controversy is complex. Some claim, others deny, that there is a crescendo of suffering in the final days of dying from cancer that can be made bearable only through sleep induction prior to death.
In part, the controversy is about numbers. Do many or only relatively few dying cancer patients require sleep induction for the control of their pain and symptoms? The controversy is also about etiology. Excessive drowsiness, semi-consciousness, and unconsciousness are symptoms. Are these due to the cancer and its progression? To concomitant physiological and neurological events? To the treatments used to manage symptoms and pain? (5) Surely diminishment of consciousness in the last several days of dying from cancer must be due in part to multiple impacts of advanced disease on body and brain, not only to treatments given to control pain and symptoms.
There are also ethical dimensions to the controversy. Nessa Coyle and colleagues have drawn attention to the profound fatigue unrelieved symptoms may produce in caregivers as well as patients (6) . Surely consent negotiations regard-• ing sleep induction must be rather trying in these circumstances. Second, those who argue for the ethical and legal justification of euthanasia must wonder about the clarity or the arbitrariness of the distinction between inducing unconsciousness and rapidly terminating life if and when dying persons experience a crescendo of unmanageable suffering in the last days of life.
The Milanstudy, Symptom Prevalence and Control During Cancer Patients' Last Days of Life, and Linda C. Garro's current review of studies on Culture, Pain and Cancer published in this issue of the Journal, direct our attention to the need for continuing, comprehensive, and methodologically sound research in the basic, clinical, and behavioral sciences related to the care of people dying from cancer. This research will increasingly illuminate uncertainties and controversies about matters of fact. We will also continue to confront controversies on matters of principle and ethics. We should not try to bury these controversies, but rather strive to resolve them by sustained and open discussion.
Need they sleep before they die? Perhaps some do so need, and who really knows how many? Dr. Cicely Saunders reminded us a few years ago that an agitated and restless patient can do little to prepare self or family for the final parting.
Indeed, death in a "sleep and a forgetting" can bring comfort and peace (7) . Dr. Saunders' second reminder is equally essential (8) . Use of drugs as a blunderbuss at the end of life would be to "write off" patients at the very moment they need our most alert, sensitive, and competent care.
